We provide a test of the Monday e¤ect in daily stock index returns. Unlike previous studies we de…ne the Monday e¤ect based on the stochastic dominance criterion. This is a stronger criterion than those based on comparing means used in previous work and has a well de…ned economic meaning. We apply our test to a number of stock indexes including large caps and small caps as well as UK and Japanese indexes. We …nd strong evidence of a Monday e¤ect in many cases under this stronger criterion. The e¤ect has reversed or weakened in the Dow Jones and S&P 500 indexes post 1987, but is still strong in more broadly based indexes like the NASDAQ, the Russell 2000 and the CRSP.
Introduction
The e¢ cient market hypothesis (EMH) suggests that at any given time prices fully re ‡ect all available information on a particular stock market. Thus, according to the (weak form) EMH, no investor can gain an advantage in predicting the return on a stock using publicly available information. However, there is a lot of evidence against the EMH in the real world of investment. There is an extensive literature on anomalies in …nancial markets including size e¤ects, stock split e¤ects, and monthly seasonals, see for example the recent volume of Keim and Ziemba (2000) for a general discussion.
It is well documented that some predictable patterns exist in the day-of-the-week returns. The phenomenon that the Monday (close Friday to close Monday) stock returns, on average, are less than returns on any other day of the week and indeed nett returns are negative has been called the Monday e¤ect (or weekend e¤ect) in the literature. There are other de…nitions of the 'Monday e¤ect', and we will examine a number of di¤erent hypotheses capturing the general spirit of this phenomenon.
The Monday e¤ect in the US stock market is extensively documented during the 1980's, see e.g., French (1980) , Gibbons and Hess (1981) , Rogalski (1984) , and Keim and Stambaugh (1984) .
On the other hand, some recent papers present evidence that the Monday e¤ect in the US and UK stock markets has gradually disappeared. For example, Fortune (1998) shows that after 1987 there is no evidence of a negative weekend return. Mehdian and Perry (2001) show that in the 1987-1998 period Monday returns are not signi…cantly di¤erent from returns during the rest of the week for the SP500, DJCOMP and NYSE (large-cap) indexes. Coutts and Hayes (1999) also show empirically that the Monday e¤ect exists but is not as strong as has been previously documented for the UK stock indexes, see also Steeley (2001) . Wang, Li, and Erickson (1997) show that the Monday e¤ect (negative returns) occurs primarily in the last two weeks of the month for a number of stock indexes consistently over the period 1962-1993, while returns for the …rst part of the month are not statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
What are the explanations for di¤erences in expected returns across days of the week? There are four types of explanation. First, that this is a statistical artifact obtained by data-snooping. Recently, Sullivan, Timmerman, and White (2001) made this critique of the calendar e¤ects literature. They applied a statistical procedure that controls for data-mining in testing for calendar e¤ects. They found that the Monday e¤ect was much less statistically signi…cant than in previous studies. Their results were obtained on the DJIA over the period 1896-1996. Hansen, Lunde, and Nason (2005) have extended this work. Both these papers compare expected returns or Sharpe ratios. The second class of explanations involve market microstructure, speci…cally, issues about settlement, dividends, and taxes. For example, French (1980) proposed the calendar time hypothesis, which would suggest that expected returns be actually larger over the weekend (Friday to Monday) because of the three calendar days in-between versus the usual one calendar day for other days of the week. This hypothesis is at odds with the data. Lakonishok and Levi (1982) suggest that expected returns should be di¤erent across days due to the 5-day settlement period, which has the e¤ect of making expected returns higher on Fridays and lower on Mondays relative to either a trading or calendar time model. The general consensus appears to be that the data does not support the precise predictions of their hypothesis, see Pettengill (2003) . The third class of explanations involve di¤erent rates of ‡ow of micro and macro information. Basically, the release of bad news tends to be delayed until the weekend, French (1980) . Steeley (2001) argues that the Monday e¤ect in the UK stock market is related to the systematic pattern of market wide news arrivals that concentrates between Tuesdays and Thursdays.
However, a number of studies have found that this does not explain the whole e¤ect, see Pettengill (2003) . The fourth class of explanations invokes the di¤erential trading patterns of various market participants. Individuals are net sellers on Mondays, and individuals behave di¤erently on Mondays versus other days of the week. Or else, it could also be due to short selling activity -short sellers close their position on Fridays as it is di¢ cult to monitor over weekends (perhaps most of them go on holiday). They sell the stocks on Monday leading to a fall in prices. There are some studies that have documented di¤erent behaviour of individuals on Mondays versus other days. For example, Pettengill (1993) …nds that individuals were much more likely to invest in risky assets when the experiments were conducted on Fridays than when they were on Mondays. 1 There are a wide range of views on the signi…cance of this e¤ect in explaining stock market anomalies. Finally, others have questioned the magnitude of the Monday e¤ect and whether it is su¢ ciently large to generate pro…ts based on simple trading rules, French (1980) .
The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically the existence of the Monday e¤ect in major stock markets using the stochastic dominance (hereafter SD) criterion. The above approaches have all been based on a comparison of expected returns or Sharpe ratios. The validity of these approaches can be questioned on many grounds. Comparison of expected returns is questionable because there may always be omitted risk factors that account for the di¤erences in mean returns.
Mean variance analysis can be formally justi…ed on economic grounds only under either normal returns or quadratic utility. Both of these hypotheses are questionable on logical and empirical 1 Interestingly, there appear to be 'weekend'e¤ects in a wide range of other social and physical phenomena. Ozone and other particulate concentrations appear to be higher at weekends than during the week contrary to expectations.
Similarly, diurnal temperature range is known to be di¤erent at the weekend, mostly higher, Forster and Solomon (2003) . Mortality from murder, by SIDS, and in hospital patients is also subject to a weekend e¤ect Wiersema (1996), Spiers and Guntheroth (2005) , and Washington Post (2004) . Many of these phenomena have only partial explanations.
grounds, as is well explained in Levy (2006) , see also Post (2003) . According to Levy (2006) (2005) is that we are using a di¤erent economic criterion that is more acceptable from a theoretical point of view than theirs. We are therefore using a di¤erent statistical technique quite unrelated to the regression and Sharpe ratio approaches they looked at and that others have followed. Indeed, our hypothesis is stronger than theirs since it concerns the whole distribution. Also, we are using a large number of di¤erent indexes, large cap and small cap, domestic and international, and over a more recent period than they did. So the combination of evidence seems quite strong. There is also a question as to what is the relevant universe to de…ne for the data snooping test, and whether in practice statisticians really are searching over so many obviously absurd potential anomalies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de…nes the hypotheses of interest and de…nes the test statistics. Section 3 presents the empirical results and Section 4 concludes.
Monday E¤ect and Stochastic Dominance
The theory of stochastic dominance o¤ers a decision-making rule under uncertainty provided the decision-maker's utility function share certain properties. It was …rst established by Hadar and Russell (1969) , Hanoch and Levy (1969) , and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). The stochastic dominance rule is more satisfactory from an economic theory point of view than the commonly used mean-variance rule since it is de…ned with reference to a much larger class of utility functions/return distributions. 2 We …rst brie ‡y de…ne the criteria of stochastic dominance.
Concepts of Stochastic Dominance
Let X 1 and X 2 be two random variables (or returns/prospects). 
for all u 2 U 1 ; with strict inequality for some u; Or
for all x with strict inequality for some x.
De…nition 2 X 1 Second Order Stochastic Dominates X 2 , denoted X 1 SSD X 2 , if and only if either:
for all u 2 U 2 , with strict inequality for some u; Or
for all x with strict inequality for some x:
The third order dominance criteria is de…ned likewise. Any ordering of outcomes derived from a speci…c utility function in U 1 ; U 2 , and U 3 will not enjoy general acceptance. This is a major reason for adopting the SD criterion. Levy (2006) gives the following simple example. Suppose that X 1 2 f1; 2g with equal probability on each outcome and X 2 2 f2; 4g likewise. Then
but var(X 1 ) < var(X 2 ) so that there exists a mean/variance optimizer who would prefer X 1 over X 2 :
However, this cannot make economic sense because X 1 X 2 with probability one.
and then recursively de…ne
2 (x) for all x with strict inequality for some x, see LMW for a further discussion on the di¤erent concepts of stochastic dominance. Davidson and Duclos (2000) o¤er a very useful characterization of any SD order and tests.
In our case we have k = 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 days of the week, and so we need a slight generalization of the above de…nition designed for two variables, and we shall adopt the stochastic maximality approach initiated by McFadden (1989) and Klecan, McFadden, and McFadden (1991).
The Hypotheses of Interest and Test Statistics
Let X 1 denotes the Monday returns and X 2 ; : : : ; X 5 denote the other weekday (i.e., Tuesday,..., Friday, respectively) returns. The hypothesis that is usually tested in the literature is that E(X j ) = E(X k ) for j; k = 1; : : : ; 5 against the alternative that E(X j ) 6 = E(X k ) for some j; k 2 f1; : : : ; 5g: This is usually performed by a Wald or F test from a regression of daily returns on daily dummies. Another test that is commonly used is of the hypothesis that E(X 1 ) = 0 against the one-sided alternative that E(X 1 ) < 0; which can be done with a t-test on the Monday coe¢ cient. 3 Neither approach really captures the essence of the Monday e¤ect as either the alternative is too general or the null is too strong. We think that the hypothesis of a Monday e¤ect the literature has in mind is that
i.e., mean returns on Monday are lower than mean returns on other days of the week. Wolak (1987) develops a statistic suitable for testing this hypothesis against its general alternative in a regression context. Our purpose is to test the following related hypothesis
Monday is (stochastically) dominated by all other weekdays,
with alternative the negation of the null. This hypothesis is stronger than (1), i.e., (1) is necessary but not su¢ cient for (2) . Therefore, if (2) is true, then so is (1).
To provide a more nuanced investigation of the Monday e¤ect, we consider the following additional null hypotheses: H 
3 Kamara (1997) and Mehdian and Perry (2001) also test the hypothesis E(
. 4 This ambiguity can capture other day of the week e¤ects as have been found in some international markets, Martikainen and Puttonen (1996) .
Then de…ne:
The null and alternative hypotheses in H 
We next discuss how to compute test statistics based on a data set fX kt : t = 1; : : : ; N; k = 1; : : : ; 5g: The test statistics we consider are based on the empirical analogues of (3) 
where
The other test statistics D2 (iv) Approximate the asymptotic p-value by
The choice of the subsample size can be data-dependent and should satisfy b ! 1 and b=N ! 0 as N ! 1; see LMW for details.
On the other hand, the (re-centered overlapping) bootstrap procedure can be described as follows:
(i) Same as Step (i) above.
(ii) Same as Step (ii) above. 
Repeat this M -times. Lakonishok and Smidt (1989) included dividend returns in the DJIA and found that for example in 1981 42% of dividend returns occurred on a Monday. However, they later found that adjusting for dividend returns makes very little di¤erence to the analysis. Steeley (2001) found something similar in the FTSE. We include both with and without dividend indexes for the CRSP data to check this.
Results

Regression Analysis
To compare our methods with the existing results, we …rst consider the traditional method that has been frequently used in the literature. That is, consider the linear regression
where R i is the stock return, D 1i is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if day i is a Monday, and 0 otherwise, D 2i is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if day i is a Tuesday, and 0 otherwise; and so forth. Table 2 ) for comparison. 6 All the data series strongly fail Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Jarque-Bera tests for normality.
the standard errors require even higher moments to exist, especially in the dependent heterogeneous environments that we would like to accommodate here, for consistency. This is a particularly salient issue here as the 1987 crash produced a very large negative return, and on a Monday. Therefore, we redid the analysis using the quantile regression techniques due to Koenker and Bassett (1978) that are robust to heavy tailed errors and outliers. In Table 1 For the other series the p values are highest for the later subperiod and q = 0:75; and generally the pattern is similar to that for the least squares estimates. This is supportive of the idea that the calendar e¤ect is not just a phenomenon about the mean of returns.
*** Table 1 .2 here*** To continue the theme of the last paragraph we investigated whether volatility is subject to a calendar e¤ect. In Table 1 .3 we report the results of linear regression using the squared residuals from the basic linear regression (11) as the dependent variable, here we just report the results for the CRSP indexes, the full results are found in the unpublished appendix, Cho, Linton and Whang (2006). The coe¢ cient on the Monday dummy is always the highest, sometimes signi…cantly so, indicating that the weekend is associated with higher volatility. This may be as expected from the calendar time hypothesis of French (1980) . However, the level of volatility is never three times that of the other days: for the DJIA 1970-1987 and the CRSP indexes it is twice the level of the other days, whereas for the NASDAQ there seems to be almost no di¤erence in the level of volatility over the weekend versus other days (the Wald test of the calendar time hypothesis is rejected for all series). The Wald tests for equality of variance indicate some statistical signi…cance to these di¤erences especially for the CRSP equally weighted indexes. For both the DJIA and the S&P500, the volatility e¤ect seems to decline in the later period relative to the earlier period. evidence of a year e¤ect. The goodness of …t is worse after accounting for the number of parameters.
In conclusion, there appears to be evidence for a Monday e¤ect in some of the stock indexes at least for some of the time, but it is somewhat sensitive to period and the overall e¤ect is more complex than can be captured in a simple mean regression speci…cation. This is one reason why we turn to the distributional analysis involved in the SD criteria. The other reason is of course the economic case we laid out earlier.
The Stochastic Dominance Approach
In the unpublished appendix, Cho, Linton and Whang (2006), we report a full set of results involving p-values for tests of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd order dominance corresponding to the eight di¤erent hypotheses for each of the series in the full sample and subsample and cut according to various parts of the month etc. 7 We give results for bootstrap and subsampling implementations. Here, we focus on a subset of the results and provide a summary of the more detailed work. Speci…cally, in Table 2 we give the subsampling results. 8 As noted by LMW, the choice of the subsample size b is important but rather di¢ cult. They propose a number of practical criteria for choosing b. In our application, we Table 2 in a table below. We …nd evidence that the e¤ect is even stronger when the previous Friday return was negative. This e¤ect generally persists across subsamples although the evidence is inconclusive for the Dow Jones and S&P 500 during the later period on days when the previous Friday return was negative. This is broadly in agreement with earlier work, for example Mehdian and Perry (2001) who also found strong e¤ects but e¤ects that did not persist for large cap indexes. We also …nd that the e¤ect is very strong in the second half of the month and that this e¤ect does persist for both large cap and small cap indexes in the later period. We …nd that when returns on Friday were positive the ordering in many cases reverses (although not for the CRSP series). On the other hand, the …rst half of the month continues to show predominantly that Monday returns are dominated by other days of the week although the evidence on this is weaker than for the full sample. This is generally consistent with the …ndings of Wang, Li, and Erickson (1997) and Mehdian and Perry (2001) . Since we have used more data and a di¤erent criterion, we …nd this compelling con…rmation of their …ndings. We remark, however, that these results are statistically harder to support because the implicit sample sizes are less and so small sample e¤ects may make these results a bit questionable. Tables  stock indexes  whole In conclusion, our methodology supports the view that there is a Monday e¤ect in many indexes, and in some cases quite a strong one. This evidence should be considered quite convincing because the null hypothesis is very strong and the result is obtained on many di¤erent series. Of course it is strongest in those indexes that are more broadly based like the CRSP indexes, suggesting that capitalization plays an important role in the magnitude and persistence of the e¤ect. The fact that the e¤ect is reversed or weakened for some large cap and international series is also interesting and needs explanation. Note that our evidence is robust to a small number of large observations unlike the previously reported regression results.
Summary of
Concluding Remarks
The results using stochastic dominance criteria con…rm earlier …ndings of a Monday e¤ect for many series over the full sample. This e¤ect has weakened for some large cap series like the DJIA and the S&P500 post 1987, but remains strong for more broadly based indexes. The a¤ect is attenuated or enhanced by other conditioning variables but still represents a puzzle to advocates of EMH. Our analysis is based on a more generally acceptable approach to ranking investments than just looking at the mean as was implicit in the earlier regression approach. The hypothesis we test is stronger than the usual one and our results suggest that regardless of investors'attitudes to risk, degree of risk aversion, or seasonal variations in risk premia, Monday returns were too low to be equilibrium returns.
This cannot be attributed to omitted risk factors. However, we caution that the methodology we have used generally requires quite large sample sizes and so there are grounds for caution regarding the main …ndings in terms of the statistical signi…cance.
What are the implications for Asset Pricing? As Fama (1991) puts it, "market e¢ ciency per se is not testable. It must be tested jointly with some model of equilibrium, an asset-pricing model."
Therefore, when we …nd anomalous evidence on the behaviour of returns, the way it should be split between market ine¢ ciency or a bad model of market equilibrium is not clear.
The evidence of stochastic dominance of Monday returns by other weekdays could be combined with behavioral theories from the psychology literature to create new asset-pricing theories that combine economic equilibrium concepts with psychological concepts to create an improved assetpricing model. For instance, the summary table reveals that there is strong evidence of a Monday e¤ect on days when the previous Friday return was negative. Market e¢ ciency asserts that apparent overreaction to information is about as frequent as underreaction, a statement that seems to be refuted by the above evidence. This underreaction of stock prices is consistent with the behavioural model proposed by Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) , to explain how the judgment biases-the representativeness bias of Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and conservatism attributed to Edwards (1968)-of investors can produce overreaction to some events and underreaction to others. This model, however, performs poorly in explaining the other anomalies reported in the literature. This suggests the need for an alternative model that speci…es biases in information processing that cause the same investors to under-react to some types of events and over-react to others and also explains the range of observed results better than the simple market e¢ ciency story. 
